

RESUMEN

El problema de marco, interpretado como un problema de determinación de la relevancia, ha sido motivo en las décadas de los 80'-90' de grandes debates y controversias entre los distintos enfoques de las Ciencias Cognitivas, perdiendo luego cierto interés. Sin embargo, esta “batalla teórica” entre distintos enfoques ha resurgido en la actualidad, convirtiéndose el problema de marco en un problema vigente dentro de las Ciencias Cognitivas. En efecto, varios enfoques alternativos al cognitivismo han retomado el problema de marco y, con ello, ha resurgido una vieja polémica alrededor de este problema.

La cuestión clave del presente trabajo estará marcada por dos hechos: 1) la relevancia y el alcance que el filósofo Jerry Fodor le ha otorgado a la resolución del problema de marco (y, particularmente, a la dificultad de la vastedad de la información), con respecto al progreso de las Ciencias Cognitivas; y 2) el surgimiento y progreso de los “enfoques postcognitivistas” dentro también del ámbito de las Ciencias Cognitivas. En efecto, a partir de estos puntos, se presentará la pregunta clave de esta tesis: ¿es posible que los enfoques postcognitivistas logren resolver la dificultad que, en mayor medida, ha llevado a Fodor a postular su peculiar pesimismo con respecto a las Ciencias Cognitivas? El problema de fondo será, pues, la aptitud de los enfoques postcognitivistas por superar la dificultad principal detrás del problema de marco.

Para atender a la cuestión clave de este trabajo, se reconocerán otras dos dificultades “inherentes” al problema de marco: la dificultad definicional y la dificultad resolutoria. Y, por supuesto, también será clave la relación que entre estas dos dificultades se establece: antes de evaluar cualquier solución que intente resolver el

problema de marco, es necesario aclarar la interpretación particular que de este problema se tenga en mente. En la primera parte de este trabajo, se aborda la primera de estas dificultades y se establece la interpretación de interés para esta tesis: el problema de marco se entiende como un conjunto de problemas estrechamente relacionados con la forma en que los seres humanos determinan relevancia. El interpretar el problema de esta manera, permitirá dilucidar la dificultad principal que ha llevado a Fodor a pronosticar su peculiar pesimismo, la dificultad de la vastedad de información. Es a través de esta dificultad que se analiza, en la segunda parte, la posibilidad de que los enfoques postcognitivistas superen el pesimismo fodoriano.

Como resultado del análisis, se concluye que algunas propuestas postcognitivistas (no todas) parecen contribuir *parcialmente* a solucionar la dificultad de la vastedad de información *en ciertos contextos específicos*. Así, si bien no se ha logrado superar el pesimismo fodoriano, se han realizado importantes avances en esa dirección.

ABSTRACT

The frame problem, interpreted as a problem of determining relevance, elicited an important controversy in the decades of the 80'-90' among opposing approaches in Cognitive Science, then losing some interest. However, this "theoretical battle" between different approaches has reemerged now and the frame problem has become a crucial problem within the framework of Cognitive Science. Indeed, several alternative approaches to cognitivism, have again taken into consideration the frame problem and thus, the old controversy behind this issue has reemerged.

The relevance and scope that Jerry Fodor has given to solving the frame problem (and more specifically, to the main difficulty that defines the frame problem, i.e., the difficulty of the vastness of information) and moreover, the emergence of "postcognitivist approaches" guide the key question of this dissertation: Is it possible that postcognitivist approaches can solve the main difficulty that has led Fodor to pose his peculiar pessimism? The underlying problem will be, therefore, the ability of postcognitivist approaches to overcome the main difficulty behind Fodor's pessimism.

In order to address the key issue of this work, I will recognize two difficulties "inherent" to the frame problem, namely, the difficulty around the definition of the frame problem and the difficulty around the solution. Of course, the relationship between these two difficulties will also be crucial: before evaluating any proposal that attempts to solve the frame problem is necessary to clarify, in advance, the particular interpretation of this problem the researcher has in mind. In the first part of this paper, I will address the first of these difficulties and establish the interpretation of interest for my dissertation: the frame problem will be understood as a set of problems closely

related to the way that humans determine relevance. By interpreting the problem in this way, we will address the main difficulty that has led Fodor to pose his pessimistic attitude toward Cognitive Sciences, namely, the difficulty of vastness of information. We will then discuss in the second part of this dissertation whether postcognitivist approaches are able to solve such a difficulty.

As a result of my analysis, I will conclude that some postcognitivist proposals (not all of them) have *partially* help to solve the difficulty of the vastness of information *in some specific contexts*. Therefore, while Fodor's pessimism has not been overcome, there are important developments in that direction.

V. REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS

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